At the beginning of March a discussion started on Contiki mailing list regarding merging of a pull request by Jeff Ciesielski that added a port of Contiki to STM32 microcontrollers using the libopencm3 Cortex M3 peripherals library. The issue raised was the difference in licensing. While Contiki is available under the permissive BSD-style license, libopencm3 uses GNU Lesser General Public License version 3. Jeff's pull request was later reverted as the result of this discussion and was similar to my own effort a while ago that was also rejected due to libopencm3 license.
Both the thread on contiki-devel and later on libopencm3-devel might be an interesting read if you are into open source hardware because they exposed some valid concerns regarding firmware licensing. Two topics got the most attention: First, if you ship a device with a proprietary firmware that uses a LGPL library, what does the license actually require from you. And second, whether the anti-tivoization clause is still justified outside of the field of consumer electronics.
I'll try to summarize my understanding of the discussion and add a few comments.
Only the libopencm3-using STM32 port of the Contiki would be affected by LGPL. Builds for other targets would be unaffected by libopencm3 license and still be BSD licensed, since binaries would not be linked in any way with libopencm3. Still, it was seen as a problem that not all builds of Contiki would be licensed with the same license. Apart from added complexity, I don't see why that would be problematic. FFmpeg is an example of an existing project that has been operating in this way for some time now.
LGPL requires you to distribute any changes to the library under the same license and provide means of using your software with a different (possibly further modified) version of the library. The second requirement is simple to satisfy on systems that support dynamic linking. However this is very rare in microcontroller firmware. In this case, at the very least you have to provide binary object files for the proprietary part and a script that links them with the LGPL library into a working, statically-linked firmware.
I can see how this can be hard to comply with from the point of the typical firmware developer. Such linking requires an unusual build process that might be hard to setup in IDEs. Additionally, modern visual tools often hide the object files and linking details completely. Using proprietary compilers it might even be impossible to have any kind of portable binary objects. In any way, this is seen by some as enough of a hurdle to make reimplementation of LGPL code easier than complying with the license.
From this point of view, GPL and LGPL licenses don't seem to have a lot of difference in practice (note that libopencm3 already switched from GPL to LGPL to address concerns that it should be easier to use in commercial products). SDCC project solved this problem by adding a special exception to the GPL.
The other issue was the anti-tivoization clause. This clause was added to the third revision of the GNU public licenses to ensure that freedom to modify software can't be restricted by hardware devices that do cryptographic signature verification. This was mostly a response to the practice in consumer electronics where free software was used to enable business models that depended on anti-features, like DRM, and hence required unmodifiable software to be viable. However in microcontroller firmware there might be reasons for locking down firmware reprogramming that are easier to justify from engineering and moral standpoints.
First such case was where software modification can enable fraud (for instance energy meters) or make the device illegal to use (for instance due to FCC requirements for radio equipment) or both. In a lot of these cases however there is a very simple answer: if the user does not own the device (as is usually the case for metering equipment), no license requires the owner to enable software modification or even disclose the source code. Where that is not the case, usually the technical means are only one part of the story. The user can be bound by a contract not to change particular aspects of the device and subject to inspections. The anti-tivoization clause also does not prevent tampering indicators. However it might be that in some cases software covered by anti-tivoization might simply not be usable in practice.
The other case was where changed firmware can have harmful effects. Some strong opinions were voiced that people hacking firmware on certain dangerous devices can not know enough not to be a danger to their surroundings. This is certainly a valid concern, but the question I see is, why suddenly draw the line at firmware modification?
Search the web and you will find cases where using a wrong driver on a laptop can lead to the thing catching fire, which can certainly lead to injuries. Does that mean that people should not be allowed to modify operating system on their computers? A similar argument was made years ago in computer security, but I believe it has been proved enough times by now that manufacturers of proprietary software are not always the most knowledgeable about their products. I am sure that every device that can be made harmful with a firmware update can be done so much easier with a screwdriver.
In general, artificially limiting the number of people tinkering with your products will limit the number of people doing harmful things, but also limit the number of people doing useful modifications. A lot of hardware that was found to be easily modifiable has been adopted for research purposes in much more fancy institutions than your local hackerspace.
I haven't been involved in the design of any truly dangerous product, so perhaps I can't really have an opinion about this. However I do believe that responsibility of a designer of such products ends with a clear and unambiguous warnings as to the dangers of modification or bypassing of safety features.